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POLETOWN NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL v. CITY
OF DETROIT: ECONOMIC INSTABILITY,
RELATIVISM, AND THE EMINENT
DOMAIN PUBLIC USE LIMITATION
Destabilization of the international economy, interregional shifts
in the factors of production, technological change, and the rise of
foot-loose industries have severely shaken the old American indus-
trial heartland.I Faced with the prospects of high unemployment and
declining revenues, states in the Middle West and North East have
attempted to deal with their economic decline by enacting redevelop-
ment legislation.2 In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of De-
I. See generally B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES:
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT (1980) (a critical ac-
count of the plant closing phenomenon); H. PERLOFF, E. DUNN, JR., E. LAMPARD &
R. MUTH, REGIONS, RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1960) (Resources for the
Future Study) (standard work on regional economic growth in the United States); K.
SALES, POWER SHIFT (1976) (study of the rise of the sunbelt states in the American
political economy); Easterlin, Regional Income Trends, 1840-1950, in AMERICAN ECO-
NOMIC HISTORY 525 (S. Harris ed. 1961), reprinted in THE REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 38 (R. Fogel & S. Engerman eds. 1971) (classic arti-
cle describing the trends in regional economic inequality in the United States); Wil-
liamson, Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: .4 Descroption
of Patterns, 13 ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGES 3 (1965), reprinted in, REGIONAL
ANALYSIS 99 (L. Needleman ed. 1968) (theoretical model of regional economic
inequality).
2. Over the years, state legislatures and the federal government have adopted a
variety of measures designed to spur economic development. These measures include
slum clearance statutes, see, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. §§ 500-525 (McKinney 1974 &
Supp. 1980), economic development corporation acts, see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 1726.01-.15 (Page 1978), and tax increment financing plans, see, e.g., ILL.
ANN. STAT. Ch. 24 §§ 11-74, 4-1 to 4-I1 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The vast majority of this
legislation has been adopted since the New Deal, when public and private sector
planners realized that classical economic assumptions about the marketplace were no
longer valid.
Obviously, a study of these statutes and their impact is beyond the scope of this
case comment. It is only important to note their diversity of features and their pri-
mary purpose--to sustain aggregate demand. See infra note 65 and subsequent text.
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trolt,3 a sharply divided Michigan Supreme Court4 upheld the use of
a redevelopment act' and dramatically expanded the state's power of
eminent domain.
The Poletown story began in 1980 when the General Motors Cor-
poration announced that it would close two Detroit plants because of
obsolescence.' Amid rumors that a new plant would be located in a
sunbelt state, General Motors approached the city and offered to
build in Detroit if an adequate site could be acquired and certain
conditions met.7 The city and the Detroit Economic Development
Corporation researched nine sites. Only one location, an old ethnic
enclave called "Poletown," was found adequate. Public reaction to
the project was favorable. Despite widespread approval, the
Poletown Neighborhood Council and several residents of the affected
area challenged the taking. They claimed that the use of the power of
eminent domain under these circumstances did not result in a taking
3. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (per curiam).
For other secondary authorities discussing Poletown, see Bixby, Condemnation of
Private Property in Order to Construct General Motors Plant is for "Public Use":
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 13 URB. LAW. 694 (1981); Shul-
man, Comment: What's Goodfor GeneralMotors ... LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.,
Aug. 1981, at 22.
4. The Poletown court divided 5 to 2. Justices Fitzgerald and Ryan filed dissents.
410 Mich. at 636, 645, 304 N.W.2d at 460, 464. For an analysis of Justice Ryan's
dissent, see infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
5. 410 Mich. at 634-35, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60. For the relevant portion of MIcH.
STAT. ANN. 5.3520(2) (Callaghan Supp. 1981), see infra note 45.
6. 410 Mich. at 636-37, 647-49, 304 N.W.2d at 460-61, 465-66. Justice Ryan's
dissent provides the most useful analysis of the Poletown facts and how they tie in
with contemporary political, social, and economic problems. See id. at 646-60, 304
N.W.2d at 465-71.
7. Id. at 649-58, 304 N.W.2d at 466-70. General Motors required a 450 to 500
acre parcel of land. The Poletown site, which the Detroit Economic Development
Corporation labeled the Central Industrial Park, consisted of 465 acres. The site en-
compassed land in the cities of Detroit and Hamtrack. Only the Detroit land was at
issue in Poletown. Id. at 637 n.2, 304 N.W.2d at 460 n.2.
Among the mutually agreed upon conditions, which Justice Ryan asserted were
dictated by General Motors, was the requirement that title to the entire site vest in the
City of Detroit by May 1, 1981. Id. at 655, 304 N.W.2d at 469. Other conditions dealt
with transportation infrastructure, utilities, taxes, and toxic waste disposal. Id. at 655-
57, 304 N.W.2d at 469-70. Justice Ryan explained these provisions by referring to the
troubles besetting the American automotive industry and the City of Detroit. .d. at
646-48, 650-52, 304 N.W.2d at 465, 467. A more analytical treatment would explain
the contractual provisions in terms of economic instability, locational economics, and
corporate externalization of costs.
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for a public use.8 The trial court denied the plaintiffs' request for
injunctive and declaratory relief.' On appeal, the Michigan Supreme
Court affirmed.'" The court held that the project served a valid pub-
lic purpose" and that the taking was for a public use. 12
The power of eminent domain is the power which inheres in a sov-
ereign to take private property for a public use upon the payment of
just compensation.' 3 Among the limitations on the power are the re-
8. Id. at 658-59, 304 N.W.2d at 470-71.
The taking was effected under Michigan's Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act,
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.26(1)-8.265(27) (Callaghan Supp. 1981), a "quick take" stat-
ute. The Act "does not confer the power of eminent domain" or "prescribe or restrict
the purposes for which or the persons by who the power may be exercised." Id. at
§ 8.265(2). It only establishes procedural safeguards.
Under the Economic Development Corporations Act, MICH. STAT. ANN.
5.3520(l)-(27) (Callaghan Supp. 1981), enacted in 1974, a municipality can con-
demn property under MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.11-.31 (Callaghan 1977) in order to
transfer it to a municipal economic development corporation under MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 5.3520(22) (Callaghan Supp. 1981).
9. 410 Mich. at 628, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
10. Id. at 634-35, 304 N.W.2d at 457. Trial was held in the circuit court between
November 17 and December 2, 1980. On December 9, the trial court entered judg-
ment for the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. Thereafter, the
plaintiffs applied to leave to appeal prior to the court of appeal's decision. Bypass was
granted and argument was heard on March 3, 1981. The trial court's judgment was
affirmed on March 13. Id. at 628-29, 637, 659-60, 304 N.W.2d at 457, 461, 471. The
expedited supreme court proceedings were necessary because of the May 1, 1981 vest-
ing requirement. For the vesting requirement, see supra note 7.
11. Id. at 634-35, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
12. Id. The plaintiffs also argued that the project violated the Thomas J. Ander-
son, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14.528(101)-(208) (Callaghan 1980 & Supp. 1981), because the project "will have a
major adverse impact on the adjoining social and cultural environment which is re-
ferred to as Poletown." 410 Mich. at 635, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (quoting plaintiffs' com-
plaint). After invoking the maxim of eyusdem generis, the supreme court held that
social and cultural environments fall outside the purview of the Act. Id. at 635-36,
304 N.W.2d at 460. Eusdem generis is a maxim of statutory construction, which pro-
vides that when general words appear in conjunction with an enumeration of particu-
lars, the former are to be limited to the class of things indicated by the latter.
Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 361
(1976).
13. Nagle v. City of Grand Island, 144 Neb. 67, 69, 12 N.W.2d 540, 541 (1943)
(taking power belongs to the state and may be exercised either directly by the legisla-
ture or through the medium of corporate bodies or of individual enterprises to whom
the legislature delegates such power); Cannata v. City of New York, 24 Misc. 2d 694,
700, 204 N.Y.S.2d 982, 989-90 (1960), modfied, 14 A.D.2d 813, 221 N.Y.S.2d 457
(1961), aft'd, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903, 182 N.E.2d 395 (power of eminent
domain inheres in the state and can only be used to take private property for a public
19831
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quirements of due process, 14 just compensation,' 5 necessity,1 6 and
use) appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 4 (1962). See also I. LEwis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 3 (3d rev. ed. 1909).
Under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, the federal govern-
ment cannot take private property for a public use without just compensation. U.S.
CoNsT. amend V. A number of states have incorporated the just compensation limi-
tation into their constitutions. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23; DEL. CONST. art. I,§ 8; MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10. Other states have expanded the
public's constitutional rights by requiring just compensation for the taking or damag-
ing of private property for a public use. See, e.g., ARIZ. CoNsT. art. 2 § 17; CAL.
CONsT. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 13. See generally
Comment, "Takings" Under the Police Power-The Development of Inverse Condem-
nation as a Method of Challenging Zoning Ordinances, 30 Sw. L.J. 723, 723-24 (1976).
The taking power must be distinguished from two other constitutional powers-the
taxing power and the police power. On the distinction between the taxing and taking
powers, see I. LEvny, CONDEMNATION IN U.S.A. § 5.02 (1969); I. LEWIS, supra, § 4;
11 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.04 (3d rev. ed.
1977); 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42 (3d rev. ed. 1980).
The distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain is more
amorphous. As a result, two theoretical models have been developed. One model
posits a continuum; that is, the police and taking powers blend into one another.
Under this theory, it is possible to have a regulatory taking. See San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Id. at
639-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1981) (five justices adhere to the continuum ap-
proach); Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8
SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 28 (1967) (statement of continuum model); Note, Inverse Con-
demnations Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26
STAN. L. Rnv. 1439, 1445-46 (1974) (criticism of continuum theory).
The other conceptual model is based on the idea that there is a distinction between
the powers; that is, each power has an outer limit. Under this view, a regulatory
taking will not be permitted. Id. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266,
598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aft'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)
(expressly rejecting continuum model). See also I. LEvEY, supra § 5.01; 1. LEWIS,
supra § 6; 11 E. McQuILL1N, supra § 32.04; 1 P. NICHOLS, supra § 1.42, which adhere
to the second conceptual approach.
14. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). In Chicago,
the Court stated:
a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private
property is taken for the State or under its direction for public use, without com-
pensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, want-
ing in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment ... and
the affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the State is a denial by
that State of a right secured .... [by the United States Constitution].
Id. at 241.
15. See, e.g. id.; Secombe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 108
(1874), citedin Cannata v. City of New York, 24 Misc. 2d at 700,204 N.Y.S.2d at 989-
90 (compensation must be made for the taking).
16. See, e.g., Town of West Hartford v. Talcott, 138 Conn. 82, 91, 82 A.2d 351,
355 (1951) (the test for the necessity of a taking is reasonable necessity, not absolute
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public, as opposed to private, use. 7 This public use requirement has
generated substantial controversy.
No precise definition of the phrase "public use" exists. Definition
is difficult because of the changing characteristics of society.' As a
result, the courts have developed two different and irreconcilable
schools of thought.'9 The older view, more respected in the nine-
teenth century, put a restrictive meaning on the public use limita-
tion." According to this view's ill-defined test, a "public use" is a
"use by the public."'" The newer and more widely accepted interpre-
or indispensable necessity); Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 474-75 (1871) (the
doctrine of necessity is the foundation of the taking power and such doctrine must
justify and limit any appropriation of property for a public use).
17. 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 13, § 7.1.
18. In New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 340, 1 N.E.2d 153,
155 (1936) (slum clearance) the court stated:
[Olver the years and in a multitude of cases the courts have vainly attempted to
define comprehensively the concept of a public use and to formulate a universal
test. They have found here as elsewhere that to formulate anything ultimate,
even though it were possible, would in an inevitably changing world, be unwise if
not futile. . .. 'The law of each age is ultimately what that age think should be
the law' [citation omitted].
Id. In a similar vein, the court in Dornan v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 331 Pa. 209,
221, 200 A. 834, 840 (1938) (slum clearance) noted that "definition has been left, as
indeed it must be, to the varying circumstances and situations which arise, with spe-
cial reference to the social and economic background of the period in which the par-
ticular problem presents itself for consideration." Id.
19. In State v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 986, 270
S.W.2d 44, 50 (1954) (constitutional challenge to redevelopment law), the court noted
that courts have put forward two theories in an attempt to describe the subjects to
which the expression "public use" applies. According to the court, one theory of
"public use" limits the application to "employment"-"occupation." Id. The more
liberal and flexible meaning makes the phrase synonymous with "public advantage."
Id. The distinctions between the two schools of thought are more fully discussed in L
LEwIs, supra note 13, § 257; 11 E. MCQTJILLIN, supra note 13, § 32.39a; C. RHYNE,
MUNICIPAL LAW § 17-2 (1957). See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
20. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.
REv. 615, 617-18 (1940) (discussion of the narrow meaning of "public use" in the 19th
century). See also, Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An
Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 603-04 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Public Use Limitation] (historical origins of the restrictive "use by the public" test);
Comment, The Public Use Doctrine. "Advance Requiem" Revisited, 1969 LAW Soc.
ORD. 688, 688-91, 696-702 (maintains that the "use by public" test retains some vital-
ity in condemnation actions dealing with public highways and community economic
development projects).
21. Two influential decisions that grappled with the problems of the older ap-
proach and rejected it in favor of a broader definition of "public use" are New York
City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 339-43, 1 N.E.2d 153, 154-56 (1936) and
1983]
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tation is broader in scope. Inclusive of older applications, the newer
definition encompasses the concepts of "public advantage," "utility,"
and "benefit." 22
While the courts continue to disagree over the meaning of "public
use," they agree on the proper demarcation of legislative and judicial
functions. Courts uniformly hold that the determination of the ne-
cessity of a taking falls within the legislative domain.23 Courts adhere
Doman v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 331 Pa. 209, 216-21, 200 A. 834, 838-40 (1938).
For a discussion of Auller and Dornan, see supra note 18.
A modem decision that implicitly applies the "use by the public" test is opinion of
the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904 (1957) (condemnation for an industrial park is
not a public use). For a discussion of the opinion, see infra notes 40-43 & 445. Other
authorities adopting the "use by the public" approach include United States v. Cer-
tain Lands in City of Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137, 138-40 (W.D. Ky.), aft'd, 78 F.2d 684
(6th Cir.), cert. granted, 296 U.S. 567 (1935), dismissed, 297 U.S. 726 (1936) ("public
use" means a use by the government for legitimate governmental purposes or a use
open to all the public, even though available to only a part of the public); Fountain
Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 107-17, 155 N.E. 465, 469-72 (1927) (a "public use"
is a use of property that affects the public generally, or any number thereof, as distin-
guished from particular individuals).
For a general discussion of the "use by the public" doctrine and its demise, see I.
LEwis, supra note 13, § 258; 11 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 13, § 32.39a; Nichols,
supra note 20, at 618-24; Comment, Public Use Limitation, supra note 20, at 603-08.
22. See, e.g., In re Petition of Detroit for Condemnation of Lands for Airport, 308
Mich. 480, 484, 14 N.W.2d 140, 142 (1944) (taking of private property for a public use
not restricted to public health and safety purposes, but includes takings for the public
welfare or necessity); Board of Water Comm'rs v. Manchester, 87 Conn. 193, 204-05,
87 A. 870, 873 (1913), affd, 241 U.S. 649 (1915) (per curiam) (public use means public
usefulness, utility, or advantage). See also 11 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 13, § 32.39a
(discussion of public benefit concept).
One commentator, adhering to 19th century conceptions of public use, vigorously
disagrees with the now predominant viewpoint:
[l]f the constitution means that private property may be taken for any purpose of
public benefit and utility, what limit is there to the power of the legislature? This
view places the whole matter ultimately in the hands of the judiciary, as though
the constitution read that private property may have to be taken for such pur-
poses as the Supreme Court deems of public benefit or advantage. . . .Whether
the public will have the use of property taken under a particular statute is a
question which may be readily determined from an inspection of the statute, but
whether a particular improvement will be of public utility is a question of opin-
ion merely, about which men may differ, and which cannot be referred to any
definite criterion.
I. LEwis, supra note 13, § 258, at 503. Lewis relied heavily on Bloodgood v. Mohawk
& H. Ry., 18 Wend. 9, 60-1 (N.Y. 1837) (Sen. Tracy, concurring). Tracy's concurring
opinion is considered the source of the "use by the public" test. See Nichols, supra
note 20, at 617; Comment, Public Use Limitation, supra note 20, at 603.
23. Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 36, 70 A.2d 612, 614 (1950) (no
judicial interference in the absence of fraud or palpable bad faith); In re Real Prop-
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to this position because a taking is considered a political act.2 4 In
contrast, courts will not necessarily accept legislative declarations of
public use. Courts show less deference on the public use issue be-
cause of the separation of powers' doctrine.25 It is a judicial function
to rule as a matter of law whether the declared use is actually a public
use. 6 In deciding this issue, however, the courts usually defer to the
erty in County and City of New York, 48 Misc. 2d 365, 264 N.Y.S.2d 802, 807 (1965),
aft'd, 25 A.D.2d 260, 268 N.Y.S.2d 957, aft'd, 18 N.Y.2d 250, 273 N.Y.S.2d 337, 219
N.E.2d 797 (1966), (no inquiry into legislative motive) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967). The same standard applies to takings that have been initiated by administra-
tive agencies. See, e.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 146, 104
A.2d 365, 371 (1954) (slum clearance). See generally McIntire, "Necessity" in Con-
demnation Cases-Who Speaks/or the People?, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 561 (1971).
In King County v. Theilman, 59 Wash. 2d 586, 594, 369 P.2d 503, 507 (1962) (con-
demnation for road held sufficiently arbitrary and capricious so as to amount to con-
structive fraud), the court indicated that "'Public use' and 'necessity' cannot be
separated with scalpellic precision, for the first is sufficiently broad to include an ele-
ment of the latter." Accord 11 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 13, § 13.24. Contra 1 P.
NICHOLS, supra note 13, § 4.11; I. LEwis, supra note 13 § 255(162). Nichols and
Lewis maintain that "public use" and "public necessity" are separate and distinct
concepts. The Theilman approach, however, is more intellectually satisfying.
24. C. BEACH, JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS § 666
(1893); C. ELLIOT, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 117
(3d ed. 1925).
25. C. ELLIOT, supra note 24, § 117. Elliot appropriately states:
[T]he question of the public character of the use is aimed at the very power of the
legislature, under the constitution, to authorize the condemnation at all; and this
question of its own constitutional power cannot be conclusively decided by the
legislature itself.
Id.
26. Housing and Redevelopment Auth. v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259
Minn. 1, 14, 104 N.W.2d 864, 874 (1960) (courts will protect a property owner when it
appears that property is in fact taken for an improper use or the conditions for the
exercise of the taking power are not met). Accord Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 322
Mich. 172, 179, 33 N.W.2d 747, 750 (1948) (question of whether a proposed use is
public is a judicial one); Murry v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 329, 52 N.E.2d 884, 887-
88 (1944) (a declaration of legislative policy is not conclusive upon the question of
public purpose). See also C. BEACH, supra note 24, § 666.
One aspect of a court's determination of a public use is whether the public use is
dominant or incidental to the private use. If the public use is dominant, the taking
will be upheld. A court will not uphold a condemnation if the private use is domi-
nant. Resolution of this issue depends upon the particular facts of each case. See
Boise Redevelopment Auth. v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 880, 499 P.2d 575, 579
(1972) (mere incidental benefit to a private interest will not invalidate an urban re-
newal plan); Wilson v. Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 376, 142 A.2d 837, 846 (1958) (pos-
sibility that some profit to private party may result is immaterial); Hogue v. Port of
Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 836, 341 P.2d 171, 193 (1959) (public use must be a "really
19831
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legislature.27
With the exception of a handful of cases, 8 all of the pre-Poletown
decisions dealing with the post-condemnation transfer of real prop-
erty to industrial and commercial interests were reached within the
context of "slum clearance" legislation.29 The courts are divided,
however, over whether the post-condemnation transfer is indicative
of a public or private use. Hogue v. Port of Seaule3 ° is representative
of the minority of decisions which reject a post-condemnation trans-
fer under slum clearance statutes. 31 In Hogue, the port district at-
tempted to condemn fully developed agricultural and residential
public" use). See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 34 (1954) (an incidental
private use can be a means to an end; namely, the public use).
27. See, e.g., State v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth., 364 Mo. 974,
987-89, 270 S.W.2d 44, 51-52 (1954) (legislative declaration of purpose entitled to
great weight); Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 45 A.D.2d 889, 890, 357
N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (1974), aft'd, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112, 335 N.E.2d 327
(resolution of public use question depends to a large extent on legislative findings),
appeal'dismissed, 423 U.S. 1010 (1975). Cf. Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141
Conn. 135, 146-47, 104 A.2d 365, 371 (1954) (agency decision open to judicial review
if it was unreasonable, made in bad faith, or resulted from an abuse of power). See
cases cited supra note 26.
28. E.g., Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d
379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d I (World Trade Center project falls within the
instrumentalities of commerce exception to the public use doctrine), appeal dismissed,
375 U.S. 78, re& denied, 375 U.S. 960 (1963). For brief discussions of the instrumen-
tality of commerce exception, see id. at 388-89, 190 N.E.2d at 404-05, 240 N.Y.S.2d at
5-6; Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 670-72, 304
N.W.2d 455, 476-77 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Other cases not falling within the slum
clearance category will be discussed subsequently. See infra notes 40-43 and accom-
panying text.
29. See cases cited infra notes 30-35 & 37; Shulman, supra note 3, at 23.
30. 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959). The 1955 act at issue in Hogue re-
quired that the condemned property be classified as marginal. Id. at 803, 341 P.2d at
174. In other words, the act was not a true slum clearance statute.
31. For other decisions rejecting a post-condemnation transfer under slum clear-
ance legislation, see City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486
(1967); Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952); Housing Auth. v. John-
son, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E. 2d 280 (1953); Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91
S.E.2d 280 (1956).
Another commonly cited decision is Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 126
N.E.2d 795 (1955) (proposed redevelopment act unconstitutional). The Massachu-
setts Supreme Court held that public funds cannot be used for the primary purpose of
acquiring private land by either condemnation or purchase in order to transfer it to a
private party for a private use. Id. at 781-82, 126 N.E.2d at 802. Cf. cases cited supra
note 26.
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property in order to establish an industrial park. 2 The court ex-
pressly rejected the defendant's theory that the plaintiffs' land could
be condemned because it had a "higher and better" economic use.33
Unlike Hogue, the slum clearance decisions upholding the post-
condemnation transfer of property to business interests have either
implicitly or explicitly approved the greater economic benefit princi-
ple. 4 Two New York decisions are illustrative. In Cannata v. City of
32. 54 Wash. 2d at 803-37, 341 P.2d at 174-92.
33. Id. at 827, 833, 341 P.2d at 187, 191. See also Edens v. City of Columbia, 228
S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956), wherein the court implicitly rejected the economic
benefit theory. In Edens, the court adopted a more conservative rationale and denied
the taking because it was not done to provide low-cost housing for the residents of the
affected area. The court stated:
Some of the decisions of other courts immediately in point that are contrary
to our view, which are not distinguishable upon different constitutional provi-
sions or former judicial interpretations, proceed upon the theory that a public use
is accomplished by the seizure and destruction of slum or "blighted" areas and
the disposition of the land thereafter to private owners for private purposes is
merely incidental. We think that this would be a strained view of the facts in the
case sub judice, and we cannot follow it. The purpose here is not to provide
better, low-cost housing to the present occupants of the area, or indeed any hous-
ing at all; but is to transform it from a predominantly low-class residential area
to a commercial and industrial area. It seems to us to be a grandiose plan which
cannot be dissected and the result of it reasonably said to be incidental. However
desirable the object is from a municipal planning viewpoint, it cannot be attained
by the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Other contrary decisions hold
that restrictions upon the future use of "redeveloped" land is a public use; but
that is in the nature of zoning, which derives from the police power.
Id. at 573, 91 S.E.2d at 284.
34. See, e.g., Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 533-34, 245 A.2d 579, 586 (1968)
(if public use which justifies taking in the first instance is use of property for purposes
other than slums, that public use continues after the property is transferred to private
parties); Graham v. Houlihan, 147 Conn. 321, 327-29, 160 A.2d 745, 749, (sections of
statute dealing with redevelopment of blighted areas are to be construed liberally to
allow taking of property that is in substantially better condition than surrounding
property) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960); Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141
Conn. 135, 143-44, 104 A.2d 365, 369-70 (1954) (redevelopment act contemplates that
after blighted area is taken for redevelopment purposes, some or all of the property
may be sold to private parties, even if they are not the original owners); People ex rel.
Adamowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n, 14 Ill. 2d 74, 79, 150 N.E.2d 792,
795 (1958) (legislature has determined as a matter of public policy that blighted va-
cant areas can be taken under redevelopment act because the property is unmarket-
able and impairs the growth of the community by preventing alternative uses);
Housing and Redevelopment Auth. v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn. 1, 7-
11, 104 N.W.2d 864, 870-71 (1960) (municipal housing authority plan to redevelop
area for light industry and commerce, but with no provision for housing to replace
condemned housing, is valid exercise of agency discretion); Schenck v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 364 Pa. 31, 36-38, 70 A.2d 612, 614-15 (1950) (redevelopment act intended to
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New York,35 the court stated that condemnation of substandard real
estate for needed industrial sites is a public use.36 Yonkers Commu-
nity Development Agency v. Morris37 reached a similar result. In Yon-
kers, the defendants tried to prevent the taking of three parcels of
land that were adjacent to an Otis Elevator Company plant."8 The
court held that private property can be taken for a public use other
than the elimination of urban blight so long as any private benefit
that might accrue is subordinate to a dominant public purpose.39
Directly confronting the issue of condemnation for industrial de-
velopment, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court explicitly rejected the
economic reasoning behind the New York decisions in Opinion ofthe
Justices.40 In the opinion, the court advised the state legislature that
a bill granting the taking power to the City of Bangor for the purpose
of acquiring land for an industrial park would be unconstitutional if
enacted.41 The court premised its decision on a narrow definition of
give wide scope to municipalities in redesigning and rebuilding areas because they no
longer meet economic and social needs of modem city life and progress).
35. 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
4 (1962).
36. 11 N.Y.2d at 215, 182 N.E.2d at 397, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
37. 37 N.Y.2d 478,335 N.E.2d 327, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1974) appeal dismnissed, 423
U.S. 1010 (1975).
38. Id. at 480-82, 335 N.E.2d at 330-32, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 116-18. The Yonkers
situation is analogous to that in Poletown. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
The Otis Elevator Company, one of the largest employers in Yonkers, threatened to
leave the city because the company lacked the space needed to expand and modernize
its facilities. Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 45 A.D.2d 889, 890, 357
N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (1974) (Munder, J., dissenting).
39. 37 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 335 N.E.2d at 331, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 117-18. Contra
Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1976), discussed supra note
33.
40. 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904 (1957). See also United States v. Two Tracts of
Land, 387 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), af'd, 532 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir.) (Tennessee
Valley Authority taking of land for construction and operation of dam and reservoir
project not capricious and arbitrary even though property might be sold to private
parties for industrial and recreational use), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976). Contra
Prince George County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278
(1975) (condemnation for industrial park in order to increase tax base, create jobs,
and diversify local economy). But see City of Owensboro v. McCormack, 581 S.W.2d
3 (Ky. 1979) (act authorizing municipality to condemn property in order to transfer it
through local development agency to private parties for industrial and commercial
purposes held unconstitutional); Karesh v. City Council, 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342
(1978) (power of eminent domain cannot be used to acquire land for a privately-
owned and operated convention center).
41. 152 Me. at 445, 448, 131 A.2d at 906, 908.
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"public use."42 As a result, the court concluded that the legislation
amounted to no more than an attempt to take private property be-
cause another party's use of the land appeared economically and so-
cially more desirable.4 3
In Poletown, the majority did not confront the use issue within the
context of slum clearance legislation. The controlling legislative pur-
pose in the Detroit Economic Development Corporation's enabling
act deals with the social and economic problems of unemployment, a
deteriorating industrial and commercial base, and declining state and
local revenues." Thus, the Michigan statute giving rise to the
Poletown taking is similar to the bill at issue in Opinion of the Jus-
tices.4" Instead of following the approach of the Maine court, how-
42. Id. at 446-47, 131 A.2d at 907. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
43. 152 Me. at 447, 131 A.2d at 907. The court relied on Crommett v. City of
Portland, 150 Me. 217, 107 A.2d 841 (1954) (slum clearance law held constitutional).
In Crommeti, the court said that redevelopment, taken alone, is not a public use for
which the taxing or taking powers may property be utilized. Id. at 236, 107 A.2d at
852. Cf. In re Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 126 N.E.2d 795 (1955), dis-
cussed supra note 3 1. The Crommett court further stated:
However beneficial it might be in a broad sense, it would clearly be unconsti-
tutional for the legislature to provide for the taking of any area in a city for the
purpose of redevelopment by sale or lease for private purposes. Such a proposal
would amount to no more than the taking of A's property for sale or lease to B
on the ground that B's use would be economically or socially more desirable.
150 Me. at 236, 107 A.2d at 852. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the statute
did not lead to impermissible takings for private uses. In the court's opinion, the
redevelopment of blighted areas was a secondary purpose. Id. The primary purpose
of the act was not to redevelop a municipality, but to clear away slums and prevent
their recurrence. Id. Accord Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954) (property may
be taken to eliminate slums and the blighted areas that tend to produce slums).
44. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3520(2) (Callaghan Supp. 1981). See infra note 45.
45. Compare the legislative purposes of the bill at issue in Opinion of the Justices
and the act in Poletown. The "emergency preamble" of HOUSE PAPER 983, ME.
LEGIS. Doc. No. 1407 (1957), quoted in Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. at 441, 131
A.2d at 904-05 reads:
Whereas, industrial development is essential to the preservation and better-
ment of the economy of the city of Bangor and its inhabitants; and
Whereas, present opportunities for such development are limited under pres-
ent conditions, and proposed imminent industrial development awaits the availa-
bility of an industrial area ...
The "declaration of necessity" of MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3520(2) (Callaghan Supp.
1981) states:
There exists in this state the continuing need for programs to alleviate and
prevent conditions of unemployment, and that it is accordingly necessary to as-
sist and retain local industries and commercial enterprises to strengthen and revi-
talize the economy of this state and its municipalities; that accordingly it is
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ever, the Polelown court adopted the economic theory underlying the
New York decisions.
After noting that the powers conferred by the Economic Develop-
ment Corporations Act46 were for the "performance of essential pub-
lic purposes," the Poletown majority casually dismissed the plaintiffs'
first line of argument.47 The court held that there is no distinction
between a "public use" and a "public purpose." 48 The majority
found that the terms were used interchangeably in the state's statutes
and decisions in order to describe "the protean concept of public ben-
efit."49 Combining this conclusion with the court's limited power of
review in condemnation actions,50 the majority held that any benefit
which accrued to General Motors was a mere incident of what was
necessary to provide means and methods for the encouragement and assistance
of industrial and commercial enterprises in locating, purchasing, constructing,
reconstructing, modernizing, improving, maintaining, repairing, furnishing,
equipping, and expanding in this state and in its municipalities; and that it is also
necessary to encourage the location and expansion of commercial enterprises to
more conveniently provide needed services and facilities of commercial enter-
prises to municipalities and the residents thereof. Therefore, the powers granted
in this act constitute the performance of essential public purposes and functions
for this state and its municipalities.
Id.
46. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 5.3520(l)-(27) (Callaghan Supp. 1981).
47. 410 Mich. at 631, 634, 304 N.W.2d at 458, 459. The majority emphasized the
statute's public purpose language. See supra note 45.
48. Id at 629-30, 304 N.W.2d at 457. Rhyne notes that "public purpose" is some-
times used as a synonym for "public use." C. RHYNE, supra note 19, § 17-2.
49. 410 Mich. at 629-30, 304 N.W.2d at 457. Michigan subscribes to a liberal
definition of "public use." See supra note 22.
50. Id. at 632-33, 304 N.W.2d at 458-59. The majority relied on Gregory Marina,
Inc. v. City of Detroit, 378 Mich. 364, 144 N.W.2d 503 (1966) (taxpayers' action chal-
lenging municipality's construction and operation of marina) and Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Marina, the court stated that the determination of what consti-
tutes a public purpose is primarily a legislative function. 378 Mich. at 396, 144
N.W.2d at 516. The legislature's determination is only subject to judicial review if it
is arbitrary. Id. at 396, 144 N.W.2d at 516. See supra notes 23 & 26 and accompany-
ing text.
The Poletown court cited Berman for the proposition that "when a legislature
speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms 'well-nigh conclusive.'" 410
Mich. at 633, 304 N.W.2d at 459; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). The
Berman standard of review-minimal scrutiny-is characteristic of the 20th century
retreat from judicial activism in substantive due process cases not involving personal
rights. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.2 n.10 (1978). See infra notes
54-55 and accompanying text.
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essentially a dominant public purpose.'
Poletown might have become just another eminent domain case
were it not for its newsworthiness52 and Justice Ryan's poignant dis-
sent.53 The justice criticized the majority's use of a minimal standard
of judicial review,54 which he asserted the court had never used in
prior eminent domain cases. 55 Justice Ryan claimed that the major-
ity erred by applying the rules of review governing aid to private cor-
porations through the taxing power. He argued that the correct scope
of review was that associated with the taking power.56 Nevertheless,
51. 410 Mich. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459. See supra note 26 and text accompany-
mg notes 35-39.
52. Poletown has received extensive coverage in the media. Justice Ryan noted
this m his dissent. Id. at 646, 304 N.W.2d at 465.
53. Id. at 645, 304 N.W.2d at 464. See supra note 4.
54. Id. at 667-69, 304 N.W.2d at 474-75.
55. Id. at 669, 304 N.W.2d at 475. Justice Ryan maintained that the court had
always made an independent determination of what constitutes a public use in emi-
nent domain cases. Id. As a result, he was critical of the majority's reliance on Greg-
ory Marina, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 378 Mich. 364, 144 N.W.2d 503 (1966), and
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
Justice Ryan was particularly distressed by the invocation of Berman. 410 Mich. at
668, 304 N.W.2d at 475. He claimed that Berman stood for minimal judicial review
of acts of Congress with respect to application of the fifth amendment taking clause.
Id.
Justice Ryan is not alone in his criticism of the use of Berman. In Edens v. City of
Columbia, 228 S.C. at 574-76,91 S.E.2d at 284-85, the South Carolina Supreme Court
voiced its objection to the landmark federal decision by citing Lashly, The Case of
Berman v. Parker Public Housing and Urban Redevelopment, 41 A.B.A. J. 501 (1955).
Lashly saw Berman as diminishing individual property rights. Id. at 503.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Poletown majority believed it applied a strict
standard of review. In its per curiam decision, the court stated:
Where, as here, the condemnation power is exercised in a way that benefits spe-
cific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects with heightened scrutiny
the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being advanced.
Such public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must be clear and
significant if it is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the legislature.
410 Mich. at 634-35, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60. The literal interpretation the majority
gave MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3520(2), (Callaghan Supp. 1981), leaves one questioning
the intellectual honesty of the court. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
Could the majority deny condemnation for the construction of a service station? See
Reed v. City of Seattle, 124 Wash. 185, 213 P. 923 (1923) (although public benefits
from lease of condemned land to filling station company, the use is a private use, not
a public use). Much depends on the meaning of the word "significant." 410 Mich. at
634-35, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60. The significance of the public benefit cannot be deter-
mined absent a specific social and economic context. See infra note 63.
56. 410 Mich. at 662-69, 304 N.W.2d at 472-75. In the section of his dissent deal-
ing with the distinction between "public use" and "public purpose," Justice Ryan
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Justice Ryan conceded that Michigan statutes and decisions used the
terms "public use" and "public purpose" interchangeably. He con-
cluded, however, that the jurisprudences of the taxing and taking
powers were not used interchangeably. 7
The only line of cases which Justice Ryan found that could support
the use of the taking power were the slum clearance decisions. 8 He
indicated that the redevelopment of blighted neighborhoods is a pub-
lic use, which can be legitimately accomplished through the means of
incidental private gain. 9 For Justice Ryan, Poletown was distin-
guishable.60 The public end of improved employment conditions
and increased state and local revenues depended upon General Mo-
tors' financial success, not the city's acquisition of land.61 As a result,
traced the usage of these terms with respect to the taxing power and the taking power.
Id. See City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 1084-85, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494
(1967) (that a project is one for which public funds may be expended is not sufficient
basis for finding that use of property is public use justifying the condemnation of
private property). Contra Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275
Md. 171, 189-90, 339 A.2d 278, 288 (1975) (issuance of government bonds to provide
for financing of private industrial and commercial development is a "public
purpose").
57. 410 Mich. at 669, 304 N.W.2d at 475.
58. Id. at 672-74, 304 N.W.2d at 477.
Justice Fitzgerald argued in his dissent that despite the superficial similarity of the
slum clearance cases, none of them justified the Poletown taking. Id. at 640-41, 304
N.W.2d at 462. He relied on In re Slum Clearance in Detroit, 331 Mich. 714, 50
N.W.2d 340 (1951) (taking of property to raze slum and aid in redevelopment consti-
tutional notwithstanding subsequent sale of property to private developers). In Slum
Clearance, the court stated that the public purpose of slum clearance is the controlling
purpose of the condemnation. Id. at 720, 50 N.W.2d at 343. The resale of the con-
demned property is an incidental and ancillary purpose designed to abate part of the
cost of clearance. Id. See Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids, 257 F. Supp. 564 (W.D.
Mich. 1966) (once primary purpose of slum clearance has been established, it is gener-
ally irrelevant what secondary purposes are involved). See also cases cited supra note
26.
Based on the Slum Clearance decision, Justice Fitzgerald concluded that the trans-
fer of land to General Motors was not incidental to the taking. 410 Mich. at 641, 304
N.W.2d at 462. According to him, it was only through the acquisition and use of the
property that the public purpose of promoting employment could be achieved. Id.
Hence, the economic benefits of the project are incidental to the private use of the
property. Id. See infra notes 59 & 61 and accompanying text.
59. Id. at 672-74, 304 N.W.2d at 477. See infra notes 26 & 58.
60. Id. at 672, 304 N.W.2d at 477. In addition to distinguishing the slum clear-
ance decisions, Justice Ryan distinguished another line of cases because they fell
within the "instrumentality of commerce" exception to the public use doctrine. Id. at
670-72, 304 N.W.2d at 476-77. See supra note 28.
61. Id. at 676, 304 N.W.2d at 478. See supra note 58.
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Justice Ryan concluded that the majority subordinated a constitu-
tional right to private corporate needs.62
Justice Ryan's analysis of the complex legal, political, and eco-
nomic factors at issue in Poletown is persuasive. One is left wonder-
ing whether the plaintiffs adopted the correct strategy by not
challenging the facial validity of the Economic Development Act 63 in
addition to the use created.64 This point, however, is academic. The
majority implicitly established the constitutionality of the Act by
holding that it was constitutional as applied.65
62. Id. at 684, 304 N.W.2d at 482. Earlier in his dissent, Justice Ryan stated that:
acceptance of [the defendants' argument]. . . would vitiate the requirement of
"necessity of the extreme sort" and significantly alter the balance between gov-
ernmental and private property rights struck by the people and embodied in the
taking clause. Just as ominously, it would work a fundamental shift in the rela-
tive force between private corporate power and individual property rights having
the sanction of the state.
Id. at 676, 304 N.W.2d at 478. But see W. WILLIAMS, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 354-60, 384-86 (1973), which persuasively argues that the shift has already
occurred. Cf. Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d
379, 398-99, 190 N.E.2d 402, 410-11, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, 13-14 (Van Voorhis, J., dissent-
ing) (conservative critique based on pre-Keynesian economic thought), appeal dir-
missed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963). See supra note 2.
63. The majority observed that the plaintiffs did not challenge the legislative dec-
laration that programs designed to alleviate unemployment and develop industry and
commerce are "essential public purposes." 410 Mich. at 631, 304 N.W.2d at 458. The
court also noted that the plaintiffs did not challenge the proposition that the legisla-
ture has the power to promote its program under MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 51. 410
Mich. at 631, 304 N.W.2d at 458. MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 51 provides:
The public health and general welfare of the people of the state are hereby
declared to be matters of primary public concern. The legislature shall pass suit-
able laws for the protection and promotion of the public health.
Neither of these questions, however, settles the issue of whether a legislature can
enact a statute with as broad a purpose as MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3520(2) (Callaghan
Supp. 1981). See supra note 48. It is arguable that such a statute is facially unconsti-
tutional because the legislature has not placed a clear limitation on the statute's scope.
In the absence of a legislative limitation, the only way a statute of this type can be
upheld is by a reviewing court reading a limitation into the act. The Poletown major-
ity adopted this approach. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
64. The Poletown majority noted that the plaintiffs were only challenging the ap-
plication of the statute. 410 Mich. at 631-32, 304 N.W.2d at 458. See supra note 63.
65. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
In a manner of speaking, the significance of Poletown lies less with the actual deci-
sion than it does with the statute giving rise to the taking.
I think [the General Motors project] transcends in its economic and social poten-
tial for this community the Renaissance or any other development that has taken
place. What we have here is a development that is being watched by older indus-
trial cities in the midwest and northeast across the Nation;... If we can assem-
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By upholding the application of the Act, the majority reinforced
the liberal definition of the public use limitation, a product of the
nineteenth century structural transformation of the American econ-
omy. Poletown indicates that individual property rights will be fur-
ther subordinated to the needs of large corporations when economic
and demographic changes require the state to intervene more force-
fully in the economy. Stabilization of the social structure requires
state intervention. Thus, courts and legislatures will define "public
use" in a manner that is consistent with the needs of the social system
during a particular historical period. The relativism implicit in this
conceptualization of the public use, however, does not mean that
each generation defines the limitation anew. Certain principles of the
law of eminent domain remain constant. It is within this overarching
framework that each generation develops its concept of the public
use.
Neil H. Lebowitz
ble this land, doing justice to those who live there, both the merchants and the
state, I think we can open up an approach for other northern industrial cities who
are landlocked as we are, who have lost population to relocate and to reassemble
and to attract industry .... I consider it of great importance, the ability of this
city to survive, and to the ability of other cities in the industrial belt, that is the
midwest, and the northeast, all these cities face exactly the same problem as De-
troit does, escalating unemployment and decreasing population, the exodus of
industry.
Trial Testimony of Mayor Coleman A. Young, quoted id. at 651 n.4, 304 N.W.2d at
467 n.4. See supra note 2.
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